

# A bounded index test to make robust heterogeneous welfare comparisons.\*

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## Abstract

Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003) develop a bounded dominance test to make robust welfare comparisons, which is intermediate between Ebert's (1999) cardinal dominance criterion —generalized Lorenz dominance applied to household incomes, divided and weighted by an equivalence scale— and Bourguignon's (1989) ordinal dominance criterion. In this paper, we develop a more complete, but less robust bounded index test, which is intermediate between Ebert's (1997) cardinal index test —an index applied to household incomes, divided and weighted by the equivalence scale— and a (new) sequential index test —an index applied to household incomes of the most needy only, the most and second most needy only, and so on. We illustrate the power of our test to detect welfare changes in Russia using data of the RLMS-surveys.

## 1 Introduction

When income units are homogeneous in non-income characteristics, there exist many tools to evaluate income distributions and the properties of these tools are well-known; see Lambert (2001) for an overview. Basically, these tools can be classified in two groups. Indices map income distributions into a comparable number measuring the welfare of the distribution under consideration, whereas dominance criteria look for unanimity among a “wide” class of such indices. The most well-known dominance criterion is the generalized Lorenz dominance (GLD) criterion due to Shorrocks (1983). Unfortunately, these tools are not well-suited to make reasonable comparisons in practice, because “At

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*the heart of any distributional analysis, there is the problem of allowing for differences in people's non-income characteristics*" (Cowell and Mercader-Prats (1999)).

To make robust heterogeneous welfare comparisons, the most well-known result is Atkinson and Bourguignon's (1987) sequential generalized Lorenz dominance (SGLD) criterion: (i) divide all income units into different need types on the basis of non-income characteristics and (ii) check —on the basis of the GLD criterion— whether the most needy in one distribution dominate the most needy in another distribution, whether the most and second most needy together in the former distribution also dominate the most and second most needy in the other distribution, and so on. The SGLD criterion is very robust —as it is equivalent to unanimity among a wide set of utilitarian welfare orderings— but it has little power to rank distributions. It has been extended by Atkinson (1992), Jenkins and Lambert (1993), Chambaz and Maurin (1998), Lambert and Ramos (2002), and Moyes (1999) to deal with changing demographics, poverty and/or the principle of diminishing transfers. We also refer to Bourguignon (1989) for a related dominance criterion.

The SGLD criterion is often called an “ordinal” dominance criterion, because the needs classes have to be defined in an ordinal way only, i.e., a ranking of all non-income types on the basis of needs. In contrast, practitioners often use equivalence scales to cardinalize needs differences between income units, expressing, e.g., that (for each income level) a couple needs  $m$  times the income of a single to reach the same living standards, with  $m$  between 1 and 2. Equivalence scales are defined with respect to a reference type, usually a single. Once defined, practitioners can (i) transform the heterogeneous distribution of incomes and types into a homogeneous distribution of equivalent incomes (for reference types) and (ii) use a standard tool (an index or dominance criterion) applied to the vector of equivalent incomes. Depending on the chosen tool, we call it either a cardinal index or a cardinal dominance approach.<sup>1</sup>

Fleurbaey, Hagueré and Trannoy (2003) consider a dominance criterion which is intermediate between the ordinal and the cardinal approach. They propose to make welfare comparisons using the GLD criterion for a bounded set of equivalence scale vectors. Choosing the bounded set as small as possible, their criterion reduces to Ebert's (1999) cardinal GLD approach —the GLD criterion applied to household incomes, both divided and weighted by the (unique) equivalence scale— and choosing the bounded set as wide as possible, their criterion is equivalent with one of Bourguignon's (1989) dominance criteria.

The different existing ways to deal with heterogeneity, as well as the main contributions,

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<sup>1</sup>As noted by Pyatt (1990) and Glewwe (1991), the use of an equivalence scale may give rise to a weighting problem. More precisely, it is not clear whether one should weight each income unit by the number of individuals or by the equivalence scale; see Ebert (1997), Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2005), and Capéau and Ooghe (2004) for a possible solution.

are summarized in table 1. The rows denote the different ways to measure the well-being of heterogeneous income units: do we use one specific equivalence scale (cardinal), a bounded set of equivalence scales (intermediate) or no scales at all, which is equivalent to a “wide” set of scales (ordinal)? The columns summarize the different ways to aggregate the resulting well-beings: do we use an index or a dominance criterion, e.g., the GLD criterion? Moving downwards (resp. rightwards) in table 1 increases robustness as we consider more equivalence scales (resp. indices), at the cost of completeness, i.e., the power to rank distributions.

	index	dominance
cardinal	Ebert (1997,1999) and Shorrocks (2005)	
intermediate		Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003)
ordinal		Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) Bourguignon (1989)

Table 1: A classification of the different ways to deal with heterogeneity.

In this paper, we explore the shaded area in table 1. In the next section, we introduce Fleurbaey et al.’s (2003) bounded dominance test and propose an alternative *bounded index* test, based on a specific iso-elastic measure (area A in table 1). Using the same bounds, the bounded index test is less robust, but more powerful compared to Fleurbaey et al.’s (2003) bounded dominance test. Choosing bounds as small as possible in the bounded index test, we get a cardinal index test in line with Ebert’s (1997) weighting scheme: an index applied to household incomes, both divided and weighted by the (unique) equivalence scale. Choosing bounds as wide as possible, we obtain a (new) *sequential index* test (area B in table 1), i.e., checking —on the basis of the iso-elastic index— whether welfare is higher for the most needy income units only, for the most and second most needy only, and so on.

We illustrate the bounded dominance and the bounded index test by measuring welfare changes in Russia from 1994 to 2002 on the basis of the RLMS (Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey) data. The post-communist era (after 1991) was characterized by rising inequality and strongly decreasing GDP per capita, reaching rock bottom with the financial crisis of August 1998. Afterwards, enhanced political stability and increasing

oil prices led to strong growth and slowly decreasing inequality. Therefore, we expect welfare to decrease in the first and to rise again in the second period. While the bounded index test is able to detect such a pattern, this is not the case for the bounded dominance test. Robustness with respect to the aggregation of well-beings, rather than with respect to its measurement, turns out to be the main culprit.

## 2 Robust welfare comparisons

### 2.1 Notation

Consider household incomes  $y \in \mathbb{R}_+$  and types  $k \in \mathbb{K} = \{1, \dots, K\}$  representing relevant non-income characteristics; types are ordered from least ( $k = 1$ ) to most needy ( $k = K$ ). A heterogeneous distribution is denoted by  $F = (p_1, \dots, p_K, F_1, \dots, F_K)$ , with  $p_k$  the proportion of households with type  $k$  and  $F_k$  the (differentiable) income distribution function of type  $k$  households defined over  $\mathbb{R}_+$  with a finite support  $[0, \bar{s}_k]$ . We focus directly on the case where demographics might change, or the proportions  $p_k$  may vary over the different distributions. Household utility functions  $U_k : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  measure the utility of a household with type  $k$  as a function of its income, with  $U_k(0)$  finite for all  $k \in \mathbb{K}$ . Social welfare in a distribution  $F$  is measured by the average household utility in society:

$$W : F \mapsto W(F) = \sum_{k \in \mathbb{K}} p_k \int_0^{\bar{s}_k} U_k dF_k. \quad (1)$$

### 2.2 A bounded dominance test

Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (FHT in the sequel) consider a lower and upper bound vector  $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{R}^K$  which satisfy

$$(1, 1, \dots, 1) \leq (\alpha_1 = 1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_K) \leq (\beta_1 = 1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_K). \quad (2)$$

Type 1 (the least needy type) will be referred to as the reference type. They impose the following conditions on household utility functions, all assumed to be twice continuously differentiable (a brief explanation follows; note already that the last condition depends on an exogenous income level  $a_1 \in \mathbb{R}_+$ ).

**A1:**  $U'_k \geq 0$ , for all  $k \in \mathbb{K}$ ,

**A2:**  $U''_k \leq 0$ , for all  $k \in \mathbb{K}$ ,

**A3:**  $U'_k(\alpha_k y) \geq U'_{k-1}(y)$ , for all  $y \in \mathbb{R}_+$  and for all  $k = 2, \dots, K$ ,

**A4:**  $U'_k(\beta_k y) \leq U'_{k-1}(y)$ , for all  $y \in \mathbb{R}_+$  and for all  $k = 2, \dots, K$ ,

$$\mathbf{A5}: \text{ a vector } (a_2, \dots, a_K) \text{ exists s.t. } \begin{cases} \text{(a) } U_k(a_k) = U_1(a_1) \text{ for all } k = 2, \dots, K \\ \text{(b) } U'_k(a_k) = U'_1(a_1) \text{ for all } k = 2, \dots, K \end{cases}.$$

The marginal utility of a type is its social priority, because it tells a utilitarian social planner where to put his money first when maximizing social welfare. Assumptions A1 and A2 are standard: all types have positive, but decreasing, social priority. In terms of money transfers, these conditions require that more income is better (Pareto principle) and transfers from rich to poor households of the same type improve social welfare (the within type Pigou-Dalton transfer principle).

Assumption A3 and A4 link the social priority of the different types. Therefore, they also tell us something about the welfare effect of money transfers between types, because a small money transfer from a type with a lower to a type with a higher social priority, must improve social welfare.




Figure 1: Partial comparability in case of bounded equivalence scales.

Figure 1 illustrates the social priority classification of two households with adjacent types  $k - 1$  and  $k$ , depending on their household incomes  $y_{k-1}$  and  $y_k$ . For all income combinations in zone (X), type  $k$  has a higher social priority than type  $k - 1$ , and vice-versa in zone (Z). In the area (Y), there is disagreement whether type  $k$  or  $k - 1$  has the highest social priority. Notice that the disagreement zone disappears when choosing  $\alpha_k = \beta_k$ , while it increases when lowering  $\alpha_k$  and/or increasing  $\beta_k$ . Ebert (1999) and Bourguignon (1989) correspond with the limiting cases in which (for all  $k = 2, \dots, K$ ) either  $\alpha_k = \beta_k$ , or  $\alpha_k = 1$  and  $\beta_k \rightarrow \infty$ .

Finally, assumption A5 depends on an exogenous income level  $a_1$  and is imposed to deal with changing demographics. At a certain income level, social welfare is invariant to transfers of population across need groups (A5a) and transfers of income across need groups (A5b).

We denote with  $\mathcal{U}(\alpha, \beta, a_1)$  the family of utility profiles  $(U_1, \dots, U_K)$  satisfying assumptions A1-A5, given  $\alpha, \beta, a_1$ . We say that a distribution  $F$  welfare dominates  $G$  according to the family  $\mathcal{U}(\alpha, \beta, a_1)$ , denoted  $F \succsim_{(\alpha, \beta, a_1)} G$ , if and only if the welfare difference  $\Delta W = W(F) - W(G)$  is positive for all profiles in  $\mathcal{U}(\alpha, \beta, a_1)$ . The following proposition shows how welfare dominance for  $\succsim_{(\alpha, \beta, a_1)}$  can be implemented. Define functions  $H_k^1$  and  $H_k^2$  over  $\mathbb{R}_+$  (for all types  $k \in \mathbb{K}$ ) as:

$$H_k^1(y) = p_k F_k(y) - q_k G_k(y), \text{ and } H_k^2(y) = \int_0^y H_k^1(x) dx. \quad (3)$$

FHT (2003) prove the following result:

FLEURBAEY, HAGNERÉ AND TRANNOY (2003). *Consider two heterogeneous distributions  $F$  and  $G$ , an exogeneous income level  $a_1 \geq \max\left(\frac{\bar{s}_1}{\alpha_1}, \frac{\bar{s}_2}{\alpha_1 \alpha_2}, \dots, \frac{\bar{s}_K}{\alpha_1 \alpha_2 \dots \alpha_K}\right)$  and lower and upper bound vectors  $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{R}^K$  which satisfy (2). Let  $Z_{K+1} : x \mapsto 0$ . Define functions  $Z_k$  recursively (starting from  $k = K$  downwards to  $k = 2$ ) as  $Z_k : y \mapsto \max_{\alpha_k y \leq x \leq \beta_k y} \{H_k^2(x) + Z_{k+1}(x)\}$ . We have*

$$F \succsim_{(\alpha, \beta, a_1)} G \Leftrightarrow H_1^2(y) + Z_2(y) \leq 0 \text{ for all } y \in [0, a_1]. \quad (4)$$

Note that the implementation of the FHT-criterion is far from trivial, due to the calculation of the maximum functions. In the next section, we present a simpler and more powerful, but less robust criterion.

### 2.3 A bounded index test

We define an iso-elastic household utility function  $I$ , which is reminiscent of Clark, Hemming, and Ulph's (1981) poverty index:

$$I : \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}_{++} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} : (y, m) \rightarrow \begin{cases} \frac{m}{1-\rho} \left( \left( \frac{y}{m} \right)^{1-\rho} - \left( \frac{a_1}{m} \right)^{1-\rho} \right), & \text{for } y \leq a_1 \\ 0, & \text{for } y > a_1 \end{cases}, \quad (5)$$

with  $a_1 \in \mathbb{R}_+$  an exogeneous income level,  $\rho$  the inequality aversion parameter, with  $\rho \geq 0, \rho \neq 1$ ,<sup>2</sup> and  $m$  an equivalence scale. We briefly explain the different parameters. The term  $a_1$  is only introduced to ensure that the iso-elastic household utility profiles (see below) become a subset of Fleurbaey et al.'s (2003) profiles. To put it differently, the term  $a_1$  ensures that condition A5 will be satisfied. But, one could also leave out the term  $a_1$  to obtain a more standard Kolm-Atkinson-Sen welfare index. The inequality

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<sup>2</sup>In case  $\rho = 1$ , the usual logarithmic case applies, i.e.,

$$I : \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}_{++} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} : (y, m_k) \rightarrow \begin{cases} m_k \left( \ln \left( \frac{y}{m_k} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{a_1}{m_k} \right) \right), & \text{for } y \leq a_1 \\ 0, & \text{for } y > a_1 \end{cases}.$$

aversion parameter is related to the cost of inequality: the higher this parameter, the more of the average one is willing to give up for an equal society. The equivalence scale  $m$  will be used to differentiate the household utility functions according to needs. More precisely, to satisfy conditions A3 and A4, we consider equivalence scale vectors  $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_K)$  —consisting of one equivalence scale for each household type— which belong to the following bounded set

$$\mathcal{M}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}) = \{ \mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{R}^K \mid m_1 = 1 \text{ and } \alpha_k m_{k-1} \leq m_k \leq \beta_k m_{k-1} \text{ for all } k = 2, \dots, K \}.$$

Choosing  $\alpha_k = 1$  and  $\beta_k \rightarrow \infty$ , for all  $k = 2, \dots, K$ ,  $\mathcal{M}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta})$  contains all equivalence scales satisfying  $m_1 = 1 \leq m_2 \leq \dots \leq m_K$ ; Choosing  $\alpha_k = \beta_k$ , for all  $k = 2, \dots, K$ , is choosing one specific equivalence scale vector  $\mathbf{m}$  equal to  $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$  (and  $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ ). We denote with  $\mathcal{I}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, a_1, \rho)$  the family of iso-elastic utility profiles  $(I(\cdot, m_1), \dots, I(\cdot, m_K))$ , one for each vector  $\mathbf{m}$  in  $\mathcal{M}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta})$ , and  $\succsim_{(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, a_1, \rho)}$  is the corresponding unanimity quasi-ordering. We obtain:<sup>3</sup>

PROPOSITION 1. *Consider two heterogeneous distributions  $F$  and  $G$ , an exogenous income level  $a_1 \geq \max(\bar{s}_1, \bar{s}_2, \dots, \bar{s}_K)$ , lower and upper bound vectors  $\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta} \in \mathbb{R}^K$  which satisfy (2) and an inequality aversion parameter  $\rho \geq 0$ . Let  $Z_{K+1}^\circ : x \mapsto 0$  and abbreviate  $\int_0^{\bar{s}_k} \frac{1}{1-\rho} \left( (y)^{1-\rho} - (a_1)^{1-\rho} \right) dH_k^1(y)$  as  $b_k$ . Define functions  $Z_k^\circ$  recursively (starting from  $k = K$  downwards to  $k = 3$ ) as  $Z_k^\circ : m \mapsto \min_{\alpha_k m \leq x \leq \beta_k m} \{ b_k x^\rho + Z_{k+1}^\circ(x) \}$ . We have*

$$F \succsim_{(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, a_1, \rho)} G \text{ if and only if } b_1 + b_2 m^\rho + Z_3^\circ(m) \geq 0 \text{ for all } m \in [\alpha_2, \beta_2]. \quad (6)$$

Notice that the functions  $Z_k^\circ$  for  $k = 3, \dots, K$  can be easily calculated, because monotonicity guarantees that the minimum can be found at one of the extremes. Furthermore, the bounded dominance and bounded index criteria are nested, i.e.,  $F \succsim_{(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, a_1)} G$  implies  $F \succsim_{(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, a_1, \rho)} G$ , for all  $\rho \in \mathbb{R}_+$ .<sup>4</sup> Finally, choosing  $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = \boldsymbol{\beta}$ , we obtain Ebert's cardinal approach for indices, i.e., apply an index to household incomes, divided and weighted by the equivalence scale. Choosing  $\alpha_k = 1$  and  $\beta_k \rightarrow \infty$ , for all  $k \in \mathbb{K}$ , our next proposition tells us that  $\succsim_{(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, a_1, \rho)}$  reduces to a (new) sequential index test in the spirit of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987):

PROPOSITION 2. *Consider two heterogeneous distributions  $F$  and  $G$ , an exogenous income level  $a_1 \geq \max(\bar{s}_1, \bar{s}_2, \dots, \bar{s}_K)$ , lower and upper bound vectors  $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (1, \dots, 1)$  and  $\boldsymbol{\beta} \rightarrow (1, \infty, \dots, \infty)$  and an inequality aversion parameter  $\rho \geq 0$ . Define all  $b_k$ 's as*

<sup>3</sup>All proofs are in the appendix.

<sup>4</sup>The family  $\mathcal{I}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, a_1, \rho)$  is, strictly speaking, not a subset of  $\mathcal{U}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, a_1)$ , because profiles in the former family are not (twice continuously) differentiable at  $(a_1, \dots, a_1)$ . Still, both criteria are nested, as we only integrate up to  $a_1$ .

in proposition 1. We have

$$F \succsim_{(\alpha, \beta, a_1, \rho)} G \text{ if and only if } \sum_{k=i}^K b_k \geq 0 \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, K. \quad (7)$$

### 3 Welfare changes in Russia 1994-2002

We illustrate and compare the bounded dominance and the bounded index test by measuring welfare changes in Russia from 1994 to 2002 on the basis of the RLMS (Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey) data. But first, we briefly describe the data and the Russian socio-economic background.

#### 3.1 The data

The RLMS surveys starts in 1992 and describes in detail the living conditions, expenditures and incomes, and socio-economic characteristics of a representative panel of Russian households.<sup>5</sup> They are conducted in two phases. The first phase consists of four rounds, covering 1992 and 1993, and might be considered more or less as a pilot survey. The second phase starts with a new panel in 1994 (round 5) and continues until today. We use the data of the second phase only, starting from Round 5 in 1994 up to Round 11 in 2002. In each round, we use the appropriate sample weights, delivered by the RLMS team, to gross up the sample to a nationally representative population of Russian households.

To measure living standards of Russian households we use non durable expenditures in constant prices. Since consumption can be considered as the “annuity value” of permanent income (see Blundell and Preston (1998)), we choose expenditures instead of income as an attempt to approximate permanent income. Moreover it is well known that expenditures on durables and luxuries are a very poor measure of the services enjoyed from the stock of durables. Therefore we have omitted durable expenditures.<sup>6</sup> With the three-digit inflation figures of the beginning of the nineties, and a figure not less than 15% in 2002, the conversion from nominal expenditures to expenditures in constant prices is of course a crucial one. Fortunately, the RLMS datasets contain expenditures both in current and in constant prices, where the RLMS researchers have converted the nominal ones into constant prices of 1992 by means of region specific (but not commodity specific) price indices. In the appendix, we sketch the evolution of the

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<sup>5</sup>See the website <http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms> and Mroz et al. (2004) for detailed information on this survey. The data can be freely downloaded.

<sup>6</sup>Another possibility would be to impute user costs for durables. But, based on experience with Round 9, we are confident that the laborious exercise of imputation of user costs would produce little or no difference for our analysis; see Decoster and Verbina (2003).



proportion and the average real expenditures of different needs groups in the Russian population over the different rounds.

### 3.2 The socio-economic background

The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by a complete collapse of the traditional economic structures, and led to repeated significant declines in the real per capita GDP. According to the World Development Indicators, real GDP per capita fell by no less than 40% from 1990 to 1996 (World Bank (2004)). The biggest contractions occurred in 1992 (-14.6%) and 1994 (-12.5%). And precisely at the moment when the biggest collapse seemed to be over (in 1997 real GDP per capita increased by 1.7%), the financial crisis of August 1998 swept away the painfully built up savings of millions of households. Starting the index of real GDP per capita at 100 in 1990, the trough of 58 was reached in 1998. From 1999 onwards, increased political stability and rising oil prices pushed the Russian economy into a promising growth path again. Real GDP per capita grew by 6.8, 10.6, 5.6 and 4.8% in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively, which, compared to 1990, restored the index up to 75.9.<sup>7</sup>




Figure 2: Evolution of real expenditures per capita (RLMS), GDP per capita and Gini ('94=100).

<sup>7</sup>Note that this spectacular collapse of GDP per capita is smoothed away to some extent when looking at consumption per capita in the National Accounts. According to the World Development Indicators in the World Bank report (2004), this aggregate only contracted from 100 in 1990 to a bottom of 87.6 in 1999. In 2002, the index of consumption per capita had already recovered up to 113.3.

In figure 2, we show the evolution of some central concepts during the period under consideration. We have expressed everything relative to 1994 by means of an index taking the value of 100 in this year. The line which slopes sharply downwards represents the average per capita real monthly expenditures in the RLMS dataset (equal to 2982 (old) Rubles in 1994). The dotted line with the triangles represents the evolution of real monthly GDP per capita (equal to 8528 (old) Rubles in 1994). The U-shape, with a recovery from 2000 onwards, is similar for both datasources, but much more pronounced in the expenditure information from the RLMS-survey. This is in line with recent findings in the debate on the evolution of world income inequality, where one observes large discrepancies between the growth of consumption in the surveys and the growth of either GDP or the consumption aggregate of GDP for many countries (see Deaton (2001)). No satisfactory explanation has been given up to now for these large differences.

The upper line with the squares shows the evolution of the Gini coefficient, calculated on the real per capita expenditures (equal to 41.3 in 1994). We observe a slight increase from 1994 to 1996 (from 41.3 to 44.4), followed by a slowly declining pattern from 1996 onwards (the Gini falls from 44.4 back to 39.9). Our findings fit well with the extensive literature on the evolution of the Russian inequality. During the first years of the transition (from 1990 to 1995) there was an unprecedented rise in inequality, well documented, e.g., in Kislytsina (2003) and in Yemtsov (2003). Both report the official Gini of Goskomstat, rising from 23.3 in 1990 to 40.9 in 1994. The first rounds of RLMS-data confirm this picture: Commander, Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov (1999) calculate an increase in the Gini of RLMS-incomes from 42.6 in 1992 to 45.3 in 1994. Lokshin and Popkin (1999), also working with income data from RLMS, find a more moderate increase from 41 in 1992 to 43 in 1995, but a pronounced rise of the Gini up to 49 in 1996. Hence, the fact that we find the highest Gini in 1996, might fit with these results. But for the second half of the nineties the picture differs, depending on whether or not one uses the Goskomstat data. Kislytsina (2003), working with both sources, finds moderately increasing inequality with Goskomstat data (from 37.5 in 1996 to 40 in 2001), but clearly declining inequality in the RLMS data, independent of whether she works with income or expenditures.<sup>8</sup> Our declining Gini from 1996 onwards corresponds very well with her results.

It is striking that the extensive literature on the inequality evolution in Russia during the transition did not pay any attention to the issue of equivalence scales. Most authors seem to take for granted that the most sensible choice is to work with per capita con-

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<sup>8</sup>Galbraith, Krytynskaia and Wang (2004) sketch a very deviating picture of sharply increasing inequality since 1997. They use Goskomstat aggregate data.

cepts.<sup>9</sup> Yet, preliminary results on the RLMS data do show a sensitivity to the scale. If we calculate the Gini coefficient for a continuum of equivalence scales, defined by the number of persons to the power  $\theta$ , where  $\theta$  varies from 0 to 1, and we then rank the years from lowest to highest Gini of equivalent income, the ranking is *not* robust. The year 1995, e.g., has the lowest Gini when calculated on household expenditures ( $\theta = 0$ ), but only the fourth lowest Gini when calculated on per capita values ( $\theta = 1$ ). There are corresponding rank reversals for other years. Hence some analysis of the robustness of the results for different equivalence scales seems appropriate here.

Equally surprising is the lack of a robust analysis with respect to the choice of the inequality measure and its underlying normative assumptions. As usual, the majority of the papers uses the Gini coefficient to investigate inequality changes. Yet, the reported findings do not seem to be robust to this choice either. In Commander, Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov (1999), e.g., inequality increases between 1992 and 1996 when judged by means of the Gini or the bottom sensitive Theils. But when inequality is measured by means of the top sensitive Theil, ordinally equivalent to the coefficient of variation, inequality unambiguously decreases over the same period. More robust methods, like the ones discussed above, are definitely appropriate.

### 3.3 Empirical illustration

Contrary to the existing empirical literature, we focus on welfare rather than inequality rankings. On the one hand, we are prepared to accept at least some partiality of the ranking of the different years, due to the required robustness. On the other hand, figure 2 gives a clear (but non-robust) picture of welfare changes in Russia. Given a steeply decreasing average and a slightly increasing inequality in the first half of the period, and the reverse in the second half of the period, welfare should go down in the first and catch up again in the second period. At least, we expect a reasonably robust welfare measure to detect parts of this U-pattern.

We use household size to divide households in 7 different needs groups, ranging from 1 to 7+ (7 or more individuals). We choose the lower bounds equal to unity: larger households need more *household* income compared to smaller ones to reach the same living standards, or  $\alpha = (1, 1, \dots, 1)$ . For the upper bounds, we ensure that the scale itself is bounded by the number of persons in the household: in terms of per capita income, larger households need less *per capita* income compared to smaller ones to reach the same living standards, or  $\beta = (1, \frac{2}{1}, \frac{3}{2}, \dots, \frac{7}{6})$ . Furthermore, we set  $a_1$  equal

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<sup>9</sup>Exceptions are Commander, Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov (1999), and Förster, Jesuit and Smeeding (2002). The former show graphs of the evolution of the Gini for different equivalence scales. But, although they find some rank reversals, they do not discuss this sensitivity. The latter use the square root of household size as the equivalence scale.

to the maximal household income over the different rounds.<sup>10</sup> Table 2 summarizes our results for the bounded index test, for different values of the inequality aversion parameter  $\rho$ . In the last column, we encircle the dominances which are also found by the FHT-criterion (for the same bounds  $\alpha, \beta$  and the same  $a_1$ ).

94 was better (+) or worse (−) compared to year (in rows) using $\rho$ (in columns)										
year	$\rho$	0.20	0.50	1.00	1.50	2.00	3.00	5.00	10.0	all
95		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
96		+	+	+	+	+	+			
98		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
00		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
01		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
02		+	+	+	+	+				
95 was better (+) or worse (−) compared to year (in rows) using $\rho$ (in columns)										
96		+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	
98		+	+	+	+	+	+			
00		+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	
01		+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	
02		+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	
96 was better (+) or worse (−) compared to year (in rows) using $\rho$ (in columns)										
98		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
00			+	+	+	+				
01								+	+	
02				−	−	−	−	−	−	
98 was better (+) or worse (−) compared to year (in rows) using $\rho$ (in columns)										
00		−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	⊖
01		−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	⊖
02		−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	⊖
00 was better (+) or worse (−) compared to year (in rows) using $\rho$ (in columns)										
01		−	−	−	−					
02		−	−	−	−	−	−			
01 was better (+) or worse (−) compared to year (in rows) using $\rho$ (in columns)										
02		+		−	−	−	−	−	−	
total		18/21	18/21	20/21	20/21	19/21	17/21	15/21	15/21	8/21

Table 2: Dominance results for the bounded index test.

The total number of rankings (in the last row) obviously depends on the choice of the

<sup>10</sup>Choosing higher values — smaller values are not allowed — decreases the number of successful rankings for both the FHT-criterion and the bounded index test (especially if inequality aversion is low).

parameter  $\rho$ . But for a wide range of  $\rho$ -values from 0.20 to 10, the number of dominances ranges from a minimum of 15 to a maximum of 20 (out of 21 possible comparisons). It is clear that the serious decline in social welfare in the first half of the period, followed by a recovery afterwards, is detected properly. In contrast, the performance of the FHT-criterion is disappointing: only 3 out of 21 comparisons can be ranked unambiguously: 1998 is dominated by 2000, 2001 and 2002.<sup>11</sup> It is quite striking that it cannot identify the steep fall in average per capita expenditures up to 1998 in combination with a slightly increasing inequality as a social welfare loss. Let us try to find out why this is the case.

Recall table 1, which classifies the different ways to deal with heterogeneous welfare comparisons. In table 3, we list the number of dominances (on a total of 21 bilateral comparisons) using six different methods.

	index	dominance
cardinal	21	3
intermediate	[15,20]	3
ordinal	[1,11]	0

Table 3: The number of dominances for the different criteria.

While the bounded index test finds between 15 and 20 dominances —depending on the inequality aversion parameter— the FHT-criterion only detects three dominances. If we move upwards —e.g., by using per capita scales, i.e.  $\alpha = \beta = (1, \frac{2}{1}, \frac{3}{2}, \dots, \frac{7}{6})$ — we (obviously) get a complete ranking (21 dominances) for the bounded index test and (still) 3 dominances for the FHT-criterion. This points to the fact that the lack of ranking power of the FHT-criterion is not caused by the robustness with respect to the needs specification, but to the robustness with respect to the concavity of the welfare function. If we move downwards —keeping  $\alpha = (1, \dots, 1)$  and letting  $\beta \rightarrow (1, \infty, \dots, \infty)$ — we find in between 1 and 11 dominances, using the sequential index test (proposition 2). For example, considering moderate values of  $\rho$  equal to 1.5 and 2, we can make 11 bilateral comparisons each. This is in sharp contrast with the the zero score of the ordinal dominance criteria (Bourguignon’s dominance criterion and the SGLD criterion) in the lower-right corner.

<sup>11</sup>We assess the FHT criterion for all incomes  $y \in [0, a_1]$ . Choosing a grid, e.g.,  $\{0, \frac{a_1}{n}, \frac{2a_1}{n}, \dots, a_1\}$  for some  $n$ , typically adds two dominances (even for large values of  $n$ ): 2000 is dominated by 2001 and 2002.

## 4 Conclusion

Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003) introduce a criterion to measure welfare in a robust way, i.e., robust with respect to both the needs specification (via a bounded set of equivalence scales) and the aggregation procedure (via the generalized Lorenz dominance (GLD) criterion). Choosing the bounded set of equivalence scales as small as possible, their criterion reduces to Ebert's (1999) cardinal GLD approach, i.e., the GLD criterion applied to household incomes, both divided and weighted by the (unique) equivalence scale. Choosing the bounded set as wide as possible, their criterion is equivalent with one of Bourguignon's (1989) dominance criteria.

We propose a bounded (iso-elastic) index test to make welfare comparisons which are robust with respect to the needs specification, but depend on the chosen inequality aversion parameter. Choosing the bounded set as small as possible, we get a cardinal index test in line with Ebert's (1997) weighting scheme: an index applied to household incomes, both divided and weighted by the (unique) equivalence scale. Choosing bounds as wide as possible, we obtain a (new) sequential index test, i.e., checking —on the basis of the iso-elastic index— whether welfare is higher for the most needy income units only, for the most and second most needy only, and so on.

In comparison with Fleurbaey et al.'s (2003) bounded dominance criterion, our criterion is simple, more complete, but less robust. To illustrate the trade-off between completeness and robustness, we compare the ranking power of the bounded dominance and the bounded index test using the Russian RLMS (Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey) data between 1994 and 2002. The cost of robustness with respect to the well-being aggregation turns out to be high. Contrary to the bounded index test, the bounded dominance criterion can hardly detect welfare changes in Russia, in spite of the increasing inequality and strongly declining GDP per capita in the period before the financial crisis (1994-1998), and the opposite afterwards (1998-2002). Furthermore, their criterion performs equally badly when using household size as the sole equivalence scale, which indicates that using generalized Lorenz dominance is the main culprit. Therefore we think that it might be worthwhile to use the bounded index test for some selected inequality aversion parameters to make welfare comparisons, without giving up the robustness with respect to the needs specification.

## Proof of proposition 1

We focus on the case  $\rho \neq 1$ ; the other case  $\rho = 1$  is analogous. By definition of the unanimity quasi-ordering  $\succsim_{(\alpha, \beta, a_1, \rho)}$ , we have  $F \succsim_{(\alpha, \beta, a_1, \rho)} G$  if and only if

$$\Delta W = \sum_{k \in \mathbb{K}} \int_0^{\bar{s}_k} I(y, m_k) dH_k^1(y) \geq 0 \text{ for all } \mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}(\alpha, \beta). \quad (8)$$

Because (for all  $k \in \mathbb{K}$ ) (i)  $a_1 \geq \bar{s}_k$  and (ii) the function  $dH_k^1$  is zero outside its support, we can rewrite the welfare difference  $\Delta W$  using the definition of  $I$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta W &= \sum_{k \in \mathbb{K}} \int_0^{\bar{s}_k} \frac{m_k}{1-\rho} \left( \left( \frac{y}{m_k} \right)^{1-\rho} - \left( \frac{a_1}{m_k} \right)^{1-\rho} \right) dH_k^1(y) \\ &= \sum_{k \in \mathbb{K}} (m_k)^\rho \int_0^{\bar{s}_k} \frac{1}{1-\rho} \left( (y)^{1-\rho} - (a_1)^{1-\rho} \right) dH_k^1(y). \end{aligned}$$

Define

$$b_k = \int_0^{\bar{s}_k} \frac{1}{1-\rho} \left( (y)^{1-\rho} - (a_1)^{1-\rho} \right) dH_k^1(y) \text{ for all } k = 1, \dots, K.$$

We have  $F \succsim_{(\alpha, \beta, a_1, \rho)} G$  if and only if

$$\sum_{k \in \mathbb{K}} b_k (m_k)^\rho \geq 0 \text{ for all } \mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}(\alpha, \beta). \quad (9)$$

Let  $Z_{K+1}^\circ : x \mapsto 0$ . Define functions  $Z_k^\circ$  recursively (starting from  $k = K$  downwards to  $k = 3$ ) as:

$$Z_k^\circ : \left[ \prod_{i=1}^{k-1} \alpha_i, \prod_{i=1}^{k-1} \beta_i \right] \rightarrow \mathbb{R} : m \mapsto \min_{\alpha_k m \leq x \leq \beta_k m} \{ b_k(x)^\rho + Z_{k+1}^\circ(x) \}.$$

We get

$$\begin{aligned} (9) &\Leftrightarrow b_1 + \sum_{k=2}^K b_k (m_k)^\rho \text{ for all } \mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}(\alpha, \beta) \\ &\Leftrightarrow b_1 + \sum_{k=2}^{K-1} b_k (m_k)^\rho + Z_K^\circ(m_{K-1}) \geq 0 \text{ for all } \mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}(\alpha, \beta) \\ &\Leftrightarrow b_1 + \sum_{k=2}^{K-2} b_k (m_k)^\rho + Z_{K-1}^\circ(m_{K-2}) \geq 0 \text{ for all } \mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}(\alpha, \beta) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \dots \\ &\Leftrightarrow b_1 + b_2 (m_2)^\rho + Z_3^\circ(m_2) \geq 0 \text{ for all } \mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}(\alpha, \beta) \\ &\Leftrightarrow b_1 + b_2 (m_2)^\rho + Z_3^\circ(m_2) \geq 0 \text{ for all } \alpha_2 \leq m_2 \leq \beta_2, \text{ as required.} \end{aligned}$$

## Proof of proposition 2

Again, we focus on the case  $\rho \neq 1$ ; the other case is analogous. Recall equation (9) and the definition of  $\mathcal{M}(\alpha, \beta)$ . Choosing  $\alpha = (1, \dots, 1)$  and  $\beta \rightarrow (\infty, \dots, \infty)$ , we have  $F \sim_{(\alpha, \beta, a_1, \rho)} G$  if and only if

$$b_1 + \sum_{k=2}^K b_k (m_k)^\rho \geq 0 \text{ for all } m_K \geq m_{K-1} \geq \dots \geq m_2 \geq 1, \quad (10)$$

with

$$b_k = \int_0^{\bar{s}_k} \frac{1}{1-\rho} \left( (y)^{1-\rho} - (a_1)^{1-\rho} \right) dH_k^1(y) \text{ for all } k = 1, \dots, K.$$

We show that equation (10) is equivalent with

$$\sum_{k=i}^K b_k \geq 0 \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, K. \quad (11)$$

**Sufficiency.** Suppose (11) holds; thus, choosing  $i = 1$ , we must have  $b_1 + \sum_{k=2}^K b_k \geq 0$ . Since  $(m_2)^\rho \geq 1$ , for all  $m_2 \geq 1$ , and  $\sum_{k=2}^K b_k \geq 0$  (from (11) for  $i = 2$ ) we must have

$$\begin{aligned} b_1 + (m_2)^\rho \sum_{k=2}^K b_k &\geq 0, \text{ for all } m_2 \geq 1, \\ b_1 + (m_2)^\rho b_2 + (m_2)^\rho \sum_{k=3}^K b_k &\geq 0, \text{ for all } m_2 \geq 1. \end{aligned}$$

Since  $(m_3)^\rho \geq (m_2)^\rho$ , for all  $m_3 \geq m_2$  and  $\sum_{k=3}^K b_k \geq 0$  (from (11) for  $i = 3$ ) we must have

$$\begin{aligned} b_1 + (m_2)^\rho b_2 + (m_3)^\rho \sum_{k=3}^K b_k &\geq 0, \text{ for all } m_3 \geq m_2 \geq 1, \\ b_1 + \sum_{k=2}^3 b_k (m_k)^\rho + (m_3)^\rho \sum_{k=4}^K b_k &\geq 0, \text{ for all } m_3 \geq m_2 \geq 1. \end{aligned}$$

We might proceed in this way, until we finally get

$$b_1 + \sum_{k=2}^K b_k (m_k)^\rho \geq 0, \text{ for all } m_K \geq m_{K-1} \geq \dots \geq m_2 \geq 1, \text{ as required.}$$

**Necessity.** Suppose (10) holds, but not (11). More precisely, there exists a  $j \in \mathbb{K}$  such that

$$\sum_{k=j}^K b_k < 0. \quad (12)$$



**1.** First, suppose  $j = 1$ . As (10) holds, we might choose an equivalence scale vector  $\mathbf{m} = (1, \dots, 1)$ , and we obtain

$$\sum_{k=1}^K b_k \geq 0, \quad (13)$$

which contradicts equation (12) for  $j = 1$ .

**2.** Suppose  $1 < j \leq K$ . Equation (12) and (13) together, we must have

$$\sum_{k=1}^{j-1} b_k > 0. \quad (14)$$

Choose an equivalence scale vector  $\mathbf{m}$  with  $1 = m_1 = \dots = m_{j-1} \leq m_j = \dots = m_K = \eta$  in (10); we must have

$$\sum_{k=1}^{j-1} b_k + (\eta)^\rho \sum_{k=j}^K b_k \geq 0,$$

which cannot be true for all values of  $\eta \geq 1$ , given equations (12) and (14).

## Some summary statistics for the RLMS

In the next table we present (i) the proportions (denoted by  $p$ ) and (ii) the average real expenditures in Rubles of 1992 (denoted by  $y$ ) of the households in the different need groups (based on household size) over the different RLMS-rounds.

household size		1	2	3	4	5	6	7+
Round 5 (1994)	$p$	17.6	28.6	23.1	21.0	6.3	1.9	1.5
	$y$	3641	7585	9174	11029	11649	10431	16007
Round 6 (1995)	$p$	18.8	27.9	22.8	20.5	6.7	1.9	1.4
	$y$	3546	6750	7842	9121	10367	11700	11295
Round 7 (1996)	$p$	19.3	27.8	22.6	20.3	6.4	2.4	1.2
	$y$	2990	5611	7174	8139	9811	9274	13225
Round 8 (1998)	$p$	19.6	28.1	22.6	20.0	6.1	2.1	1.5
	$y$	2225	3980	5233	6417	7369	7447	9959
Round 9 (2000)	$p$	20.3	27.9	22.1	19.9	6.1	2.3	1.4
	$y$	2367	4351	6378	7644	8105	9072	12767
Round 10 (2001)	$p$	21.5	27.8	21.6	19.5	6.2	1.8	1.6
	$y$	2698	4982	6703	8509	9253	11448	13693
Round 11 (2002)	$p$	21.1	27.7	21.9	19.6	6.2	2.0	1.5
	$y$	2772	4900	7483	8784	9147	9459	12471

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